The arrest of witnesses has two purposes: (i) to prevent a subsequent witness from adapting his or her testimony to that of a previous witness; and (ii) assist the investigator in uncovering unreliable witness statements. See State v. Harrell, 67 N.C. App. 57 (1984); State v. Jackson, 309 N.C. 26 (1983). The seizure of witnesses pending their testimony is authorized by both G.S. 15A-1225 and Rule of Evidence 615, which authorize seizure at the request of one of the parties or ex officio. However, rule 615 does not allow the following four types of witnesses to be excluded: A request for the seizure of witnesses must normally be made before the trial and in writing, but there is no law prohibiting the request from being made after the appointment of the jury. See State v. Mason, 295 N.C. 584 (1978).
As mentioned in the official commentary on Rule 615, forcible confinement is recommended “as a means of deterring and detecting forgeries, inaccuracies and collusion.” See State v. Wilds, 133 N.C. App. 195 (1999); State v. Anthony, 354 N.C. 372 (2001). However, the trial judge`s decision to grant or refuse receivership is discretionary and will only be reversed if an abuse of authority is proven. See State v. Fullwood, 323 N.C. 371 (1988); released for other reasons, 494 U.S. 1022 (1990); State v. Harrell, 67 N.C.
App. 57 (1984). 1988 — Pub. L. 100-690, which ordered that the rule be amended by inserting “a” before “party who is not a natural person”, could not be enforced because the words “party who is not a natural person” did not appear. However, the word `a` was replaced by the transitional amendment of the Court of Justice by order of 25 April 1988 et seq. of 1 November 1988. Some courts have concluded that, while the forcible confinement rule may apply from testimony to trial, it should only be applied in exceptional circumstances. For example, in Skidmore v. Northwest Engineering Co., 90 F.R.D.
75, 75–76 (S.D. Fla. 1981), the court took a stricter approach to depositing the depositor, finding that the receivership rule applies to deposits, but only in special circumstances. In the Skidmore case, a plaintiff requested that his expert witness be present during his testimony to help counsel understand the technological message of the defendant`s employee in a product liability lawsuit. The respondent argued that the presence of the expert was unfair because the plaintiff`s expert had not yet formed an opinion and that it was not necessary because the respondent`s employee was not himself an expert. The court argued that such a sanction might not be effective and that such a practice should be avoided as much as possible. In order to clarify the issue of the credibility of witnesses, the court instructed the parties and lawyers to ensure that no witness discusses statements in this case without a court decision or the consent of the opposing party. The court ultimately ruled that a party is not entitled to invoke FRE 615 in its oral testimony, but must instead prove just cause, as required by federal rules of procedure. The court ruled that the defendants had failed to meet the burden of proof in issuing a protection order. When sequestration is ordered, the court has broad powers to tailor its order to the needs of the case, including outside the courtroom.
For example, the court may order witnesses not to interact with each other before trial or while they wait outside the courtroom, and it may also seize witnesses during preliminary hearings. See Geders v. United States, 425 U.S. 80 (1976) (recognition of broad court power to call witnesses before, during, and after testimony); State v. Stanley, 310 N.C. 353 (1984) (similar participation); State v. Jackson, 309 N.C. 26 (1983) (court may order separation of two cellmates before trial); State v. Hyde, 352 N.C. 37 (2000) (it was for the court to authorize or refuse seizure during preliminary hearing); State v. Byrd, 67 N.C.
App. 168 (1984) (Judge has discretion to sequester witnesses at hearings and probable hearings). The invocation of the sequestration rule is crucial in cases where witnesses are likely to be accused of discrepancies in their trial and/or hearing. As you can imagine, if witnesses were allowed to leave the witness box and rush to tell other witnesses what questions they are asked, what they are struggling with, what important points were raised during cross-examination, etc., witnesses would certainly have the opportunity to clarify their contradictions and statements. This rule is established in centuries of precedents. However, it is less clear whether a party to a dispute may request that witnesses be heard before trial. This problem is more common in the context of reporting and can be particularly difficult in cases of medical malpractice involving multiple experts. For example, can an expert verify the testimony of another expert before giving his or her own testimony? Can a party invoke the rule at the beginning of the investigation and require that witnesses be excluded from the review of statements until trial? What if the testimony is really jury testimony? In Thome v.